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Civil society participation in global environmental and other arenas of transna-
tional politics, particularly in open international institutions such as the
UNFCCC at COP-15, involves both insider and outsider coalitions and strate-
gies.1 Insider strategies seek to inºuence government ofªcials directly through
lobbying. Outsider strategies use demonstrations, media and other activism to
put public pressure on government ofªcials.2 As a civil society representative at
Copenhagen COP-15, I offer an alternative interpretation of the major causes of
disenfranchisement to Fisher’s.3 According to Fisher, “the addition of the cli-
mate justice movement to the repertoire of action at this round of negotiations
ended up leaving civil society out in the cold.”4
Fisher claims that three forces led to the disenfranchisement of civil soci-
ety at COP-15: increased registration, poor planning and “the merging of move-
ments.”5 While poor planning was clearly an issue, this paper demonstrates that
the other forces of increased registration and what Fisher calls the “merging of
movements” contributed to more effective participation and inºuence by civil
society, particularly environmental and climate justice groups. Civil society
groups did not contribute to the development of the Copenhagen Accord; many
supported the disenfranchised countries that rejected the Accord as inadequate
and undemocratic.
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Civil Society and COP-15
At COP-15, there were strong and coordinated outsider and insider strategies
used particularly by three environmental and climate justice groupings: Climate
Action Network (CAN), Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) and 350.org.
Efforts by these groups to inºuence agenda-setting for COP-15 in 2009 have
continued since COP-13 in Bali in 2007. One of the most effective efforts to
inºuence the agenda was undertaken by 350.org and its GCCA and CAN allies.
By the end of COP-15, “the 350 ppm [parts per million] target, which once
seemed so obscure, had become an object of plain speech, had been endorsed
by 112 countries, and had in many ways supplanted the 2°C temperature target
as the mark and measure of true climate stabilization.”6 Thousands of civil soci-
ety groups campaigned extensively to achieve this in the lead-up to COP-15, in-
cluding over 5,000 350.org events in 181 countries on October 24, 2009. CNN
called this “the most widespread day of political action in the planet’s history.”7
Gaining the support of 112 countries for the 350ppm target was also a major
achievement.8 As Bill McKibben, a founder of 350.org, commented, however, it
was not the right 112 countries that endorsed the 350ppm target.9 The EU, US,
China and India have not endorsed it.
CAN and GCCA brought together a global network of over 450 environ-
mental and climate justice NGOs from almost all nations. Before COP-15, they
had agreed through CAN a 10-page document outlining the essential elements
for a successful, “fair, ambitious and binding” climate deal.10 This formed the
focus for CAN and its allies’ strategy and communications throughout COP-15.
In terms of agenda-setting, the terminology of a “fair, ambitious and binding”
outcome became widely used by the environmental and climate justice groups
and by many vulnerable countries pushing for a strong agreement at COP-15.
Insider and Outsider Coalitions and Strategies at COP-15
During the ªrst week of negotiations, there were no restrictions on registered
NGO delegates’ access to the Bella Center in Copenhagen where COP-15 was
held. At the Bella Center Metro station, civil society groups were protesting and
distributing information to the large number of government and other dele-
gates arriving at and leaving the negotiations. Although, as is usual in the
UNFCCC negotiations, NGO delegates are not normally allowed access to the
formal negotiations on the proposed text, a number of NGO delegates who
were members of ofªcial national delegations and other friendly members of
national delegations kept interested civil society delegates well informed of the
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negotiations’ progress or lack thereof. The NGO delegates were also lobbying
government ofªcials.
On the afternoon of the ªrst Wednesday of COP-15, there was a hastily or-
ganized noisy demonstration inside the COP. Videos of this were posted on
YouTube.11 This demonstration was in support of Tuvalu and its powerful,
widely applauded, speech supporting its proposed Protocol that morning in the
COP Plenary. Later that day, “NGOs from around the world united in voting
Tuvalu the ªrst ever winner of Ray of the Day—to be given on rare occasions for
actions to substantially advance progress in global climate talks.”12 This was
done as part of the well-attended “Fossil of the Day” presentations inside the
COP, which were covered by a range of media and had videos were posted on-
line. This illustrates one of the many ways that civil society inside the COP
linked with civil society outside both in Copenhagen and across the world via
modern communications technology.
Restrictions on the number of NGO delegates allowed in started during
the second week and became more severe towards the end of that week. I was
one of only 300 NGO delegates that received a pass for the ªnal Thursday and
Friday due to a ªre restriction limit of 15,000 people. A large contingent of gov-
ernment delegates and staff accompanied the 120 heads of state attending the
ªnal stages.13
There were, however, many more than 300 NGO delegates with access for
the ªnal two days, because when the restrictions were announced, many govern-
ments added key NGO delegates to their ofªcial delegations. At a UNFCCC
meeting with the NGO constituency focal points, the UNFCCC noted that on
that second Wednesday, 3,000 additional delegates were registered to take part
in the meeting,14 mostly NGO delegates who were to have been excluded. NGO
delegates were added to the US and Australian ofªcial national delegations.15 I
have been told but have been unable to conªrm that China added all the Chi-
nese NGO delegates to its ofªcial delegation. I can, however, ªnd among the
ªnal list of ofªcial Chinese delegates, two representatives from Greenpeace and
one from WWF.16 As a result of NGO exclusion, many NGO representatives had
more privileged access as they were members of government delegations. The
ªnal number of delegates registered under ofªcial government delegations rose
from the 8,041 initially reported by the UNFCCC16 to 10,591,17 indicating that
over 2,500 NGO delegates may have become government delegates.
Fisher said the call to storm the Bella Center posted on the internet “con-
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tributed to the decision to limit access to NGO delegations.”18 The issues lead-
ing to the restrictions had more to do with the ªre restriction capacity limit and
security concerns, with 120 world leaders attending. The Danish security forces
were well set up to prevent any efforts to storm the venue.
Disenfranchisement and the Copenhagen Accord
As Dimitrov documents, COP-15 “was a failure whose magnitude exceeded our
worst fears, and the resulting Copenhagen Accord was a desperate attempt to
mask that failure.”19 Disenfranchisement of much of global society, both coun-
tries and civil society was manifest in the process that resulted in the Copenha-
gen Accord.
A recent report, based on unauthorized audio recordings, of the negotia-
tions on the ªnal day of the COP between the leaders of 25 countries convened
by the Danish Prime Minister documents the deadlock on a draft agreement.20
Not only was civil society disenfranchised by these negotiations, so were many
of the 100 national leaders and the lead negotiators of other countries not repre-
sented in this select group. The drafts of the ªnal declaration under discussion
by the select group included provisions not only for limiting the rise of global
temperatures to 2°C above pre-industrial levels by 2050, but, unlike the ªnal
Copenhagen Accord, they also indicated how this might be achieved. There was
mention of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80 percent by 2050 and even
the possibility of a mid-term goal by 2020.21
When the group of 25 failed to reach agreement, President Obama agreed
with the leaders of China, India, Brazil and South Africa a minimalist agree-
ment with no reference to speciªc emission reduction targets, which became the
Copenhagen Accord. In this ªnal stage, even the EU was excluded from the pro-
cess.22
This ªnal act of disenfranchisement enabled President Obama to try to
claim progress by announcing the Copenhagen Accord at 10.30pm on 18 De-
cember, the ªnal scheduled day of the meeting. He asserted that we have “made
a meaningful and unprecedented breakthrough here in Copenhagen. For the
ªrst time in history all major economies have come together to accept their re-
sponsibility to take action to confront the threat of climate change.”23 At 11pm,
although civil society representation in the COP was diminished, CAN Interna-
tional held a press conference, webcast both in the COP and outside, declaring
the Copenhagen Accord a “non-deal.”24
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Mexico25 and Australia26 (both members of the group of 25) held press
conferences that were supportive of the Accord. The EU’s press conference
reºected its concerns about the weakness of the Copenhagen Accord and was
less positive, noting “this was not a perfect agreement” and “it will not solve the
climate threat.”27
The Danish Prime Minister presented the Copenhagen Accord, “devel-
oped by a representative group of leaders from all groups around the world” to
the ªnal plenary of the COP at 3am on 19 December.28 Disenfranchisement was
one of two major concerns then expressed by some countries. Seven countries
openly opposed the Accord in the plenary as “undemocratically created, and
too weak to save the world.”29 Tuvalu was the ªrst country to object, indicating
that announcing a deal by press conference “is disrespectful of the UN pro-
cesses” and that we were “being offered money to betray our people and our fu-
ture, however, our future is not for sale.” The latter statement generated ap-
plause in the plenary, even at 3.15am.30 Venezuela, Cuba, Sudan and Bolivia
supported Tuvalu. Bolivia commented that it was “most surprised and offended
by the methodology that has been used,” that millions of people are threatened
by climate change and “we are being told that we have one hour to decide on
the rights of those millions of people, we do not believe that this is respectful.”31
Nicaragua then proposed an alternative set of decisions for adoption that
included a requirement that the developed country parties to the Kyoto Proto-
col negotiate the details of second commitment period by June 2010. Following
this proposal, the meeting was suspended.32 The eventual outcome was that the
Copenhagen Accord was not adopted but only noted. This occurred after over
ªve hours of further discussion and following the replacement of the Danish
Prime Minister as Chair of the COP.32 The phrase used—“take note”—merely
acknowledges the existence of the Copenhagen Accord. Without strong support
from environmental and climate justice groups for a fair, ambitious and bind-
ing outcome from COP-15, the seven countries may not have been willing to
challenge the US, EU, China, India and Brazil, which had all endorsed the Co-
penhagen Accord.
At COP-15, there was the full emergence of a new and powerful alliance of
environmental and climate justice groups with the vulnerable countries most at
risk from climate change. This alliance had begun at the Bali COP in 2007 and
played a major role at COP-15.33 Disenfranchisement was indeed widespread at
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COP-15, but it was not conªned to civil society that had many actors working
cooperatively with state actors and in the latter stages, some who became of-
ªcial government delegates. Many were pushing for a fair, ambitious and bind-
ing outcome from the COP. Regrettably, this outcome was not achieved.
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